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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Following his re-trial, David Joseph Meister appeals from his convictions
for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Meister
contends the district court abused its discretion in limiting the testimony of Dr.
Richard Ofshe regarding the "weight and credibility" the jury should give Meister's
confession.

Statement Of The Facts
"On December 11, 2001 Tonya Hart was shot twice in her home in
Moscow, Idaho, which she shared with her boyfriend Jesse Linderman.

The

shooter approached the front entrance of Tonya's trailer and then proceeded to
the back entrance." State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 238, 220 P.3d 1055, 1057
(2009) (footnote omitted). 1

"The shooter then retreated behind the trailer,

running through a snow covered field and eventually exiting the field on a nearby

kl

road."

"A neighbor heard the gun shots and went to Tonya and Jesse's

trailer.

He then called 911 and proceeded unsuccessfully with resuscitation

efforts."

kl

"Tonya was pronounced dead at the scene."

kl

"In August of 2002 the police interrogated David Meister in connection
with Tonya's death and Meister confessed that he shot Tonya in exchange for a
$1000 payment from Jesse Linderman." Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at
1057.

The state charged Meister with first-degree murder and conspiracy to

1

Jesse Linderman was also commonly known as "Shorty." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.814,
L.3 - p.815, L.3.)

1

commit murder. 2

!si

Prior to trial, Meister claimed his confession should be

suppressed because it was allegedly coerced, taken in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the entire interview was not videotaped. See
Meister, 148 Idaho at 238 n.2, 220 P.3d at 1057 n.2. That motion was denied.
(R., Vol. 5, pp.856-862.)

"At trial Meister attempted to admit evidence that another individual, Lane
Thomas, was responsible for Tonya's shooting." Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220
P.3d at 1057. "The district court refused any evidence which showed Thomas
was an alternate perpetrator of the crime, including several confessions."
jury convicted Meister of both charges alleged.

!si

!si

A

Meister appealed. See id.

On appeal, Meister raised four issues: (1) "the state's failure to record his
interview with the police as a violation of his due process rights because it left
him without the evidentiary means to challenge the techniques used by the
police during the interview"; 3 (2) error in the exclusion of "evidence of the
prosecutor's admission that the state did not have sufficient evidence to convict
Linderman of conspiring with Meister to commit murder"; (3) error in the
exclusion of alternate perpetrator evidence proffered by Meister; (4) denial of his
motion for a new trial; and (4) violation of his rights at sentencing. Meister, 2007

2

The state also charged Linderman with conspiracy to commit murder, but the
charge was later dismissed "because the only evidence tying Linderman to the
crime was Meister's confession." Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at 1057.
3

Meister did not pursue on appeal the other grounds asserted in the district court
in support of his request for suppression. State v. Meister, 2007 WL 2821981 *2
n.2. (2007), review granted and opinion vacated by Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220
P.3d 1055.
2

WL 2821981 at *3-17. The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded the "district court
did not err in admitting evidence of Meister's confession and in excluding
evidence related to Meister's co-conspirator." kL at *17. The Court, however,
found error in the district court's failure to admit the alternate perpetrator
evidence and at sentencing. kL The state filed a petition for review, which the
Idaho Supreme Court granted. Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at 1057.
The only issues presented on review related to the admissibility of the
alternate perpetrator evidence and the sentencing error alleged by Meister and
found by the Court of Appeals. Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220 P.3d at 1057.
The admissibility of Meister's confession was not presented to the Idaho
Supreme Court for consideration.

kL at n.2.

Addressing the alternate

perpetrator issue, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the relevant legal standard
for admissibility of such evidence and concluded the "district court applied the
wrong legal standard to determine whether Lane Thomas' confessions should be
excluded." Meister, 148 Idaho at 243, 220 P.3d at 1062. Accordingly, the Court
vacated Meister's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. 4 kL
On remand, and prior to the second trial, the state filed a motion asking
the district court to apply the law of the case doctrine and preclude Meister from
re-litigating any issue addressed by either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, including Meister's request to suppress his confessions.

(R., Vol. 2,

pp.297-306.) After briefing and argument, the district court entered an opinion

4

Because the Court vacated Meister's conviction and remanded his case for a
new trial, it declined to address the sentencing issue. Meister, 148 Idaho at 243,
220 P.3d at 1062.
3

and order on the state's motion, granting the motion "with respect to the
determinations set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Meister, 148
Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009)," and "with respect to rulings of the district
court which were not appealed after the first trial, unless a showing [could] be
made that a decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice"
but denying the motion with "respect to the Idaho Court of Appeals opinion." (R.,
p.354.)
In light of the district court's ruling, Meister again sought suppression of
his confessions on the same bases previously asserted - coercion, an alleged
Miranda violation, and as punishment for the failure to record the entirety of
Meister's interview with police. (R., Vol. 2, pp.368-427; R., Vol. 3, pp.487-518.)
As part of his request for suppression, Meister stated his intent to "rely on the
testimony of Richard Ofshe, Ph.D., to fully explain the coercive nature of the
interrogation." (R., p.513.) The court held a hearing on Meister's suppression at
which Dr. Ofshe testified. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1512-1556.) The court subsequently
entered an order denying Meister's request to exclude his confession.

(R.,

pp.1069, 1074-1080.)
After the court denied Meister's renewed efforts to suppress his
confession, the state filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent Dr. Ofshe from
testifying at trial. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1472-1478.) Meister filed a written response (R.,
Vol. 7, pp.1502-1579) and at the hearing on the state's motion, asked the court
to deny the motion "at least to the extent that it would prevent Dr. Ofshe from
talking - or from testifying that false confessions do, in fact, exist, and what his

4

training and experience and education has shown to be the milieu in which they
arise" (6/27/2011 Tr., p.34, L.22 - p.35, L.2). Meister also argued that Dr. Ofshe
should be allowed to testify about "the fact that the State failed, although it had
ample opportunity, to record the interrogation and at least the first two of three
statements made by [him]." (6/27/2011 Tr., p.35, L.23 - p.36, L.4.) The court
took the matter under advisement and later entered a written order, summarizing
its ruling as follows:
Dr. Ofshe is prohibited from testifying regarding the voluntariness
of Meister's confession and whether the confession was true or
false. Further, Dr. Ofshe is prohibited from offering an opinion
regarding the lack of a full recording of the August 29, 2001
interaction between Meister and law enforcement. The State's
motion in limine is denied with respect to the presentation of the
general subject of false confession and how false confessions are
created.
(R., Vol. 8, pp.1591-1592.)
After a 23-day trial, a jury again convicted Meister of first-degree murder
and conspiracy to commit murder.
concurrent fixed life sentences.

(R., Vol. 9, p.1934.)

The court imposed

(R., Vol. 9, pp.2005-2008.)

appealed. (R., Vol. 9, pp.2011-2020.)

5

Meister timely

ISSUE
Meister states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by precluding Dr. Ofshe
from testifying specifically to the procedures associated with Mr.
Meister's confession?
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Meister failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
denying his request to have Dr. Ofshe testify about the "weight and credibility"
the jury should give Meister's confession?

6

ARGUMENT
Meister Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Limiting Dr. Ofshe's Testimony
A.

Introduction
Meister asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his

"request to question Dr. Ofshe regarding the application of his theory to the facts
of this case" so the jury could decide what "weight and credibility" to give
Meister's confession. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Application of the law to the facts
shows Meister's claim fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the

province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77
(Ct. App. 2011 ). A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v.
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998); State v. Winn, 121
Idaho 850, 855, 828 P.2d 879, 884 (1992). "A lower court does not abuse its
discretion if the court correctly recognized the issue as one of discretion, acted
within the bounds of its discretion, and reached its decision by exercising
reason."

State v. Almaraz, 155 Idaho 584, _ , 301 P.2d 242, 258 (2013

(citations omitted).

7

C.

Meister Has Failed To Show Error In Relation To The Limitations On Dr.
Ofshe's Testimony
Expert testimony is only admissible if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E.
702. "[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 1.R.E.
702. "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing." I.R.E. 703. Although I.R.E. 704 allows "[t]estimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible" even if it "embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact," it is well-established that
"[e]xpert testimony that only vouches for the credibility of another witness
encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility
determinations, and therefore does not assist the trier of fact as required by Rule
702."

Almaraz, 154 Idaho at _ , 301 P.3d at 257 (quotations and citation

omitted).

In other words, "an expert's opinion, in a proper case, is [only]

admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would require the
expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed
evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the jury's function."
~at_, 301 P.3d at 257-258 (quotations and citations omitted).
The district court cited the relevant legal standards prior to trial in
determining the proper scope of Dr. Ofshe's testimony and allowing him to testify
about "the general subject of false confession and how false confessions are
8

created" (R., Vol. 8, p.1592), which was precisely what Meister requested
(6/27/2011 Tr., p.34, L.22 - p.35, L.2 (Meister asking that Dr. Ofshe be permitted
to testify about the existence of false confessions and the "milieu in which they
arise")). Dr. Ofshe did just that, testifying at length and in detail about the 20
years of work he has devoted to "the subject of influence in police interrogation."
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.2939, Ls.3-5; see generally Tr., Vol. 4, pp.2939-3004.) Dr. Ofshe
specifically explained his expertise in this area as follows:
My work has been in -- focused on understanding the tactics
and techniques of influence that are used in police interrogation,
actually studying police interrogations from records where records
are audiotapes, videotapes, transcripts and even debriefing people
who have been interrogated in unrecorded interrogations; but
principally, through the study of actual records of police
interrogation.
My work has been focused on understanding how
interrogation works in general, how it is that someone who initially
denies involvement in a crime can be gotten to rethink their position
and admit they, indeed, did commit the crime and then give a
confession to the crime. And also to understand how it is that
someone who did not commit the crime can be gotten to rethink
their position, decide to offer a confession, and then make up a
confession to the crime that's being investigated.
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.2939, L.9 - p.2940, L.1.)
Dr. Ofshe, using "a diagram to illustrate[ ] it," then explained why
"someone would confess to doing something they didn't actually do." (Tr., Vol. 4,
p.2952, L.1 - p.2953, L.3.) In providing his explanation to the jury, Dr. Ofshe
highlighted techniques used by law enforcement in interviewing suspects and the
purpose of those techniques, including a lengthy description of the Reid method
of interrogation as well as criticisms of that method. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2957, L.10 p.2969, L.9, p.2978, Ls.9-18, p.2979, L.6 - p.2989, L.16.)
9

Dr. Ofshe also

described three types of "false confessions" -

voluntary, compliant, and

persuaded - and testified the diagram he used to illustrate his testimony applied
to compliant false confessions. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2973, L.15 - p.2975, L.6.) And,
Dr. Ofshe explained the analysis for determining whether a confession is reliable
and the factors he would consider in assessing the validity of a confession. (Tr.,
Vol. 4, p.2997, L.15 - p.2998, L.9, p.3003, L.3 - p.3004, L.7.)
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Ofshe about his work and
publications on the issue of false confessions, including his claim that he has
reviewed over a thousand interrogations.
Ls.3-5.)

(Tr., Vol. 4, pp.3013-3024, p.3026,

When asked how many of those interrogations he found resulted in

false confessions, Dr. Ofshe said he did not have "any idea" but ultimately
agreed with the principle that no one knows the rate of either false or truthful
confessions. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3026, L.6 - p.3028, L.1.)
Following cross-examination, defense counsel asked the court "for
permission to question Mr. Ofshe about the application of his theory to the facts
of this case." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3029, Ls.4-6.) Defense counsel argued:
And the reason I do that, Your Honor, is because the State has
opened the door to that. They obtained a pretrial ruling that he
could not opine whether or not his confession was a false one.
Having obtained that ruling, then impeach him through repeated
questioning of how many of the cases he reviewed does he believe
to be false confessions.
So, the State is going to have its cake and eat it too, saying
the defense can't ask for an opinion, but we're -- we're going to
impeach them just as if he gave the opinion. And the jury is left
with a misimpression that we have gotten from Mr. Ofshe that he
thinks [Meister's] confession is false. And they're going to go in the
jury room and talk about it and say, well, that lawyer told us this,
and then the expert never said that the confession was false. And

10

the State undercut him, where he wouldn't say how many of the
thousands.
So, we have been -- [Meister] has been greatly prejudiced
by this line of attack. And the only way to remedy -- remedy that,
Your Honor, is to let Dr. Ofshe give his conclusion. And I don't
mean his conclusion that Mr. Meister's confession is false. We've
never asked that. It was never our intention. But simply allow Dr.
Ofshe to testify how the facts of this case specifically operate in the
diagram that he explained yesterday.
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.3029, L.7 - p.3030, L.7.)
The court denied Meister's request, rejecting Meister's assertion that the
door had "been opened to allow that line of questioning in this case." 5 (Tr., Vol.
4, p.3032, Ls.6-10.)

Meister contends this ruling was an abuse of discretion.

(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)

Meister is incorrect.

The question presented to the

district court following the prosecutor's cross-examination was whether that
examination "opened the door" to allowing Dr. Ofshe to "testify how the facts of
this case specifically operate in the diagram" that he used to illustrate his
testimony. It did not. The scope of Dr. Ofshe's testimony on direct was precisely
what Meister requested pre-trial.

That the state elicited testimony on cross-

examination that Dr. Ofshe did not know how many of the cases he reviewed
involved a false confession and agreed that no one knows the rate of true or
false confessions in no way "opened the door" to testimony about how his theory
applied to the facts of Meister's case. Indeed, the ultimate point made by the

5

The court did not elaborate on the basis for its conclusion that the state did not
open the door. However, in response to Meister's claim that it did, the
prosecutor noted her questioning on cross-examination only illustrated that Dr.
Ofshe's model, which he presented to the jury, was not reliable because it is
based on his own interpretation of the facts and there was "really not any way for
him to test his theory." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3031, Ls.6-20.)

11

cross-examination Meister claimed "opened the door" was that there is no way to
know whether a confession is true or false - a principle that Dr. Ofshe
acknowledged on direct. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2959, Ls.3-5.)
The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Meister's
argument that the state "opened the door" to allow additional testimony from Dr.
Ofshe regarding application of his theory to Meister's confession.
Even if the Court addresses the question of whether Dr. Ofshe should
have been permitted to "testify how the facts of this case specifically operate in
the diagram" he drew for the jury, Meister has failed to show the district court
abused its discretion in denying Meister's request. Before addressing the merits
of this issue, it is important to first try and understand what Meister meant when
he sought permission to have Dr. Ofshe "testify how the facts of this case
specifically operate in the diagram that he explained" to the jury. (Tr., Vol. 4,
p.3030, Ls.5-6.) It is clear from the record that Meister was not asking that Dr.
Ofshe be allowed to offer "his conclusion" that the "confession is false." (Tr., Vol.
4, p.3030, Ls.2-4.) But, when Meister made the request, he did not articulate
specifically what testimony he wanted Dr. Ofshe to give that had not already
been elicited.
The information that can be gleaned from the record in this regard
occurred during a break in the state's cross-examination of Dr. Ofshe, and
before Meister's request to expand the scope of Dr. Ofshe's testimony, at which
time Meister inquired whether the court would "deem the record sufficient in
terms of an offer of proof from Dr. Ofshe on the parts of his testimony that have

12

been excluded by [the] pretrial ruling," referring to Dr. Ofshe's testimony during
the pretrial motion hearing. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3019, L.11 - p.3020, L.2.) The state
did not object and the court "grant[ed] the request to take that pretrial testimony
as an offer of proof." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3020, Ls.7-13.) Nevertheless, Meister did
not identify what aspect of that testimony he wanted to elicit on redirect and his
offer of proof was made in relation to "the parts of [Dr. Ofshe's] testimony that
[were] excluded by [the] pretrial ruling." 6
previously

noted,

the

pretrial

ruling

(Tr., Vol. 4, p.3019, Ls.11-16.)
excluded

As

testimony "regarding the

voluntariness of Meister's confession and whether the confession was true or
false" and "offering an opinion regarding the lack of a full recording of the August
29, 2001 interaction between Meister and law enforcement."

(R., Vol. 8,

pp.1591-1592.) Since Meister expressly stated his request to have Dr. Ofshe
"testify how the facts of this case specifically operate in the diagram" did not
include "his conclusion that Mr. Meister's confession was false," the state can
only assume, based on his reference to the testimony excluded by the pretrial
ruling, that his request related to the voluntariness of the confession or the lack

6

It is the defendant's burden to provide an offer of proof in support of his claim
that evidence should be admitted. See I.R.E. 103(a)(2); State v. Harvey, 142
Idaho 527,536, 129 P.3d 1276, 1285 (Ct. App. 2006).
13

of a full recording. 7 Based on his argument on appeal, Meister seems to pursue
the former. (See Appellant's Brief, p.22 ("Dr. Ofshe should have been permitted
to discuss the specific questions and procedures employed by Detective
Westbrook without commenting on whether he believed Mr. Meister or Detective
Westbrook to be credible.").)
Meister first argues that, by not allowing Dr. Ofshe to apply his expertise
to the facts of the case, he was deprived of the opportunity to challenge the
"weight and credibility" of his confession. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) In support of
this argument, Meister relies on Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 2002), an
Indiana case in which Dr. Ofshe testified, asserting the case is "directly on point."
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Meister's argument fails.
The whole purpose of Dr. Ofshe's testimony, which was heard by the jury,
was to provide them the framework for evaluating whether Meister's confession
was credible. Any contrary position taken by Meister is without merit and it is
unclear why Meister believes Dr. Ofshe's inability to "apply his expertise to the

7

Although the court excluded evidence of Dr. Ofshe's opinions related to the
failure to record, during direct examination, Dr. Ofshe made several comments
about the importance of recording, even linking recording to "professionalism."
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.2948, L.25 - p.2949, L.12, p.2950, Ls.3-11, p.2968, Ls.20-24.)
Although the prosecutor did not object to Dr. Ofshe's comments while he was
testifying, at a recess during his testimony, she stated her position that his
comments about recording were not "appropriate" in light of the court's pre-trial
ruling and asked that he "be admonished not to make such comments." (Tr.,
Vol. 4, p.2970, Ls.4-11.) The court recognized the prosecutor's concern but
stated Dr. Ofshe had not yet gone "beyond" the court's ruling. (Tr., Vol. 4,
p.2970, Ls.12-22.) Defense counsel also appeared to recognize the concern,
noting he had asked Dr. Ofshe "during the break" not to "use the word 'record'
anymore in his testimony" in an effort to abide by the court's ruling. (Tr., Vol. 4,
p.2970, L.23 - p.2971, L.5.)
14

facts of this case," precluded him from challenging the "weight and credibility" of
his confession since that is precisely what he did not only through Dr Ofshe's
testimony, but through his own testimony as well the cross-examination of
Detective Edward Westbrook to whom Meister confessed. (See generally Tr.,
Vol. 3, pp.2101-2106, 2114-2212 (cross-examination of Detective Westbrook);
Tr., Vol. 5, pp.3146-3241 (Meister's testimony claiming his confession was false
and coerced).)

Indeed, it is difficult to believe Meister's request to allow Dr.

Ofshe to provide testimony beyond that allowed by the district court would have
resulted in anything but an opinion on the credibility of Meister's statements to
law enforcement, which is prohibited by the Rules of Evidence. Almaraz, supra.
Meister's reliance on the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Miller is
misplaced because Meister presented the very testimony the court in Miller held
was erroneously excluded in that case.

In Miller, the trial court precluded Dr.

Ofshe from presenting any testimony to the jury. 770 N. E.2d at 772 ("Dr. Ofshe
did not present any testimony to the jury").

On appeal, the Indiana Supreme

Court held that exclusion of Dr. Ofshe's testimony was erroneous, reasoning:
In the present case, the fact that the content of the
interrogation was not in dispute is not a proper basis on which to
exclude Dr. Ofshe's testimony. The defendant's trial strategy
clearly included his challenge to the voluntariness of the
incriminatory statements in his videotaped police interview. The
trial court's threshold determination of sufficient voluntariness for
admissibility of the videotape did not preclude the defendant's
challenge to its weight and credibility at trial. From our review of
the circumstances in the present case, the general substance of
Dr. Ofshe's testimony would have assisted the jury regarding the
psychology of relevant aspects of police interrogation of mentally
retarded persons, topics outside the common knowledge and
experience. In the event that some of Dr. Ofshe's testimony to the
jury would have invaded Rule 704(b)'s prohibition of opinion

15

testimony as to the truth or falsity of the defendant's statements,
the trial court could have sustained individualized objections at trial.
Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 773-774.
Meister got exactly what Miller did not - Dr. Ofshe's testimony "regarding
the psychology of relevant aspects of police interrogation." What he did not get,
and what he was not entitled to, was Dr. Ofshe's opinion that his confession was
the product of coercion, i.e., was not credible.
Meister also relies on the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 301 P.3d 242. 8 Relevant to this case, the Court in
Almaraz addressed whether the district court abused its discretion when it ruled
that a defense expert could not testify about specific procedures employed in
obtaining an eyewitness identification using a photograph.

kl at_,

301 P.3d

at 257-258. The Court held:
Here, the district court abused its discretion when it ruled
that Dr. Reisberg could not testify about the specific procedures
used in [the eyewitness] Hust's interview. In making its ruling, the
court excluded the testimony as invading the province of the jury
without making a determination as to whether it would have
assisted the jury. The district court was correct that expert opinion
testimony as to the accuracy of Hust's identification would invade
the province of the jury, but Dr. Reisberg's testimony was not an
opinion as to Hust' s credibility. Rather, Dr. Reisberg would have
testified about the specific instances of police suggestiveness,
which would have been helpful to the average juror's understanding
of whether the interview was conducted in an overly suggestive
way. Courts should not overly restrict testimony that assists the
jury.

The Court issued its opinion in Almaraz, supra, on April 1, 2013, nearly 18
months after Dr. Ofshe testified at Meister's trial. The state does not suggest the
timing of the Almaraz opinion means it is not controlling; it is only noted for the
purpose of acknowledging that the district court could not have considered it as
part of its analysis.
8
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court "still recognize[d] that an expert
cannot opine to the accuracy of the eyewitness identification or the credibility of
any witness as those matters are reserved for the jury." Almaraz, 154 Idaho at
_ , 301 P.3d at 258.

"However, an expert witness may testify to specific

instances of police suggestiveness that may call into question the reliability of the
eyewitness testimony."

kl

For example, "[t]estimony relating to the proper

guidelines for conducting an accurate interview or lineup, whether or not those
procedures were followed in the case at hand, and the consequences of noncompliance with those procedures does not invade the province of the jury."

kl

The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded Dr. Reisberg should have been
allowed to testify about the "specific procedures employed" by the officer
conducting the identification and "how empirical research has shown those
procedures to be suggestive," which did not constitute an "opinion on the
credibility or accuracy of the eyewitness testimony itself."

kl

Meister "submits the only distinction between this case and Almaraz is
that Almaraz concerned an eyewitness identification expert and this case
concerns a false confession expert," a distinction he contends has "no legal
difference." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) To the contrary, the distinction is apparent
when the Court considers the content of the testimony authorized by Almaraz "the proper guidelines for conducting an accurate interview or lineup, whether or
not those procedures were followed in the case at hand, and the consequences
of non-compliance with those procedures." Alamraz at_, 301 P.3d at 258.
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There are no "proper guidelines" for interviewing a suspect other than those
commanded by the state and federal constitutions. Whether those constitutional
requirements are satisfied is a legal question for the courts to resolve, and a
question that was resolved against Meister in this case.

Although it may be

appropriate to provide the jury with information explaining that confessions can
be obtained as a result of using certain tactics, like those Dr. Ofshe testified to,
allowing Dr. Ofshe to "discuss the specific questions and procedures employed
by Detective Westbrook" (Appellant's Brief, p.22) and show how those questions
and procedures fit within his coercion theory is the same as allowing Dr. Ofshe to
state his opinion that Meister's confession was coerced and should, therefore,
not be given any weight because it was not credible.

Unlike attacking the

reliability of an eyewitness identification, which the witness believes to be true,

Meister's request, at its core, involved having Dr. Ofshe attack the credibility of
Meister's own statements, which Meister testified he knew to be false. That goes
beyond the point of what is permissible and would "require [Dr. Ofshe] to pass
upon the credibility" and weight of Meister's confession. Almaraz, 154 Idaho at
_ , 301 P.3d at 257-258. As such, Meister has failed to establish the district
court erred in precluding Dr. Ofshe from applying his false confession theories to
the facts of this case.
Even if Meister has met his burden of showing error, any error is
harmless. "Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously
objected to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test."

kl at_,

301 P.3d at 258-259 (citation omitted). "[T]he error is harmless if the
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Court finds that the result would be the same without the error."

KL.

at _ ,

301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted).
Although Dr. Ofshe did not identify "specific questions and procedures
employed by Detective Westbrook" he believed were coercive, as Meister
contends he should have been allowed to do (Appellant's Brief, p.22), there is no
reason to conclude the jury could not identify those questions and procedures
using the information provided by Dr. Ofshe.

Indeed, Dr. Ofshe even told the

jury: "I see my job as doing everything possible to help the people who are going
to make that judgment to make the most intelligent, well-informed judgment that
they can based on understanding how interrogation works and understanding
what's important about the result of an interrogation. I'm a teacher." (Tr., Vol. 4,
p.3050, L.22 - p.3051, L.3.)

Dr. Ofshe, in addition to providing the jury with

extensive information on police tactics and coerced confessions, gave the jury a
list of factors to use in assessing the validity of Meister's confession (Tr., Vol. 4,
p.3003, L.3 - p.3004, L.7.) The jury had the opportunity to assess Meister's
confession based on this information and based on the testimony of Detective
Westbrook and Meister and in the context of all of the other evidence presented
at trial.

Based on this alone, this Court can easily conclude, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the result would have been the same even if Dr. Ofshe
identified Detective Westbrook's tactics for the jury.
Beyond

that,

the

weight

of the

evidence

against

Meister was

overwhelming and was not solely dependent on Meister's confession.

The

prosecutor cogently summarized the case against Meister in her closing
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argument.

(Tr., Vol. 6, p.3950, L.24 - p.4016, L.13.)

Among the evidence

presented was the testimony of Michael Garrison. (Tr., Vol. 3, pp.2265-2315.)
Garrison testified that he sold a High Point 9mm handgun and a box of
ammunition to Meister just a few days before Tonya's murder - the same type of
gun and ammunition used to kill Tonya. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1470, L.24-p.1473, L.17;
Tr., Vol. 3, p.2274, Ls.9-15, p.2276, Ls.10-16, p.2287, L.13 - p.2289, L.7.)
Meister declined to complete a bill of sale for the purchase and when asked why
he wanted the gun, Meister "mentioned something along the lines of, I'm going to
shoot somebody in the face." (Tr., Vol. 3, p.2280, L.23 - p.2281, L.20.)

The

owner's manual for the gun was subsequently found under the refrigerator where
Meister lived. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.3288, Ls.9-15.)
Consistent with what Meister told Garrison regarding why he wanted the
gun, James Collyer testified that he saw Meister a few weeks after the murder
and they were watching "one of those real life detective shows" and Meister said
he "killed somebody once." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2910, L.3 - p.2912, L.21.) Meister
then proceeded to tell Collyer he "had been given $1,000 to kill a girlfriend of a
co-worker," "that he went up to the trailer house, knocked on the door" and
"when she answered the door, he shot her in the face" and then "shot her in the
chest." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.2912, L.22 - p.2913, L.5.) Meister said he "stashed some
clothes and some shoes in a low spot in a field," changed his shoes, "took the
gun and the other shoes and dumped them in a dumpster or a garbage can."
(Tr., Vol. 4, p.2913, Ls.6-14.)
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Among some of the most damning evidence was Meister's response to
Garrison's and Collyer's testimony. Unsurprisingly, Meister took the position that
Garrison and Collyer were both lying with respect to the incriminating statements
he made to them. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.3365, L.10- p.3366, L.4, p.3367, L.1 -p.3368,
L.24.) Indeed, Meister accused a number of the state's witnesses of lying. (Tr.,
Vol. 5, pp.3359-3362 (Meister claims Jeremy Hogan lied about Meister offering
him a box of 9mm ammunition); p.3366 (Meister claims Marty Collyer must have
"misunderstood" when he said Meister told him someone gave him money to buy
the gun); p.3354 (Meister claims Duane Scott lied); pp.3383-3384, 3439 (Meister
claiming some of the officers who testified lied).)
Meister did, however, admit he bought a gun from Garrison but testified to
what can only be characterized as a far-fetched explanation of his purpose in
buying it and his disposition of it within a day of buying it. According to Meister,
he bought the gun to "experiment" with "the idea of owning and possessing a
gun, maybe to go out and shoot the gun" or to "explore" "possibly selling"
weapons to "make a couple of bucks here and there." (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3086, Ls.124.) Upon getting the gun and ammunition, Meister claimed he examined it after
it was delivered to him at work, threw away the box and accessories on the way
home after work, thought about hiding it under the refrigerator but it did not fit,
apparently losing the owner's manual under the refrigerator in the process
(since, for some unknown reason, it did not get thrown away with the box), and
ultimately decided to take it to a party the next day, where he carried it in his
waistband with the box of ammunition alternating between various pockets. (See

...?1'

generally Tr., Vol. 4, pp.3100-3113; Tr., Vol. 5, pp.3299-3307) Meister testified
he took the gun to the party thinking he might either sell it to someone there, like
someone under 21 or a felon who could not buy a gun legally, or go out shooting
with his friends later. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3111, Ls.6-12; Tr., Vol. 5, p.3305, L.20 p.3306, L.7.) Deciding to pursue a sale once at the party, Meister testified he
approached a stranger and asked if he wanted to buy it; the stranger was not
interested. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3116, L.17 - p.3117, L.22.) But, luckily for Meister,
another stranger, having heard there was a gun for sale, approached him shortly
thereafter and asked to buy the gun and produced $250.00 cash for the
purchase. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3118, L.1 - p.3119, L.21.) Of course, being a stranger,
Meister did not know the buyer's name, and did not ask for a name nor would he
have given his own since it was an "illegal" transaction, but Meister was able to
recall that the buyer wore a "warm-colored shirt" and a "close fitting necklace"
made of shells or bamboo. (Tr., Vol. 4, p.3118, L.1 - p.3120, L.18.)
Given the nature of the evidence Meister claims was improperly excluded
and the overwhelming evidence of Meister's guilt, any error related to the
limitations on Dr. Ofshe's testimony was harmless.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction
entered upon the jury verdicts finding Meister guilty of conspiracy to commit
murder and first degree murder.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2013.

~

JES~ICA M. LORELLO
Depl;ty Attorney General
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